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INT

CT I ON.

tODU

f'oi'tr.ly

The privilee

gt.c-ited corporatiuns

with irpunity iiad its

mitting injuries

of the ancient 1,rucjsses

inflexibility

ori-in

only in

-nd in

the un-

(a).

bearing to beings having a nomin-l existence

liability
their

of any substantial

reason for aunying the

l' corporations, coupleu with the

rapid growth anci the

these legal

bodies were

t-.

to apply writs of " personal

willingness of the courts

This absence

of' com-

consequent

assumin6,

fact of

importance

which

allowed and compelled

the courts to overturn the distorted views of conservative ju0JLes G.nd to erect

in

their

stead new principles

founded on public policy and naturcl justice.
Thus the responsibility

arise

from any pro-

In a sense corporations hud always

cess of evolution.
stood on an equal

did not

footing with

individuals,

and the

principles which, altered their position toward those
with whom they dealt
ters

which have

only remuved one of the many fet-

so often inturfered with the aaninistra-

tion of justice.
(a). Yarborough v.
on Torts, p. 5.

?Lank of England 16 East

b,

Pollock

lifting

was nut reac.,ud

the result

Worded differently,
corporations

to the plane t1 cu>

oc'uiy but

by

sim-

approach for part-

ply uy providing a means of reri-diLl
ies seeking redress.
The equit T of' the rule is
of argumient.

too ap

The responsibility

1

arent

imposed

is Lut the obtKe

vious consequei.:ce of corporate existence
of corporate rignIts:

to aaryit

"nd exercise

naturally, duties &rnd privileges

are inselarable ana survive or fall

tobether. No court

in changing the rules of law desired to discriminate
against

corporations.

interests

In

an opinion advurse to the

of corporations

"n

no enemy to corporations.
them as a proof,and

in

e2

unparalIAed acvancenient
Equality alone was

judue s-ys:

*I

an,

On the contrary, 1 look upon

no small degree,

the

of rnou(ern civilization.

sought;

law corporations come

American

and now,

cause of the
"(a).

with regard to the

into being as do individuals, en-

dowed with rigrts b? tile State and placed under certain
restraints by the same powe
2 r.
Davis, J, in N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co.,
34 N. Y. 30, says:
on principle,
(a)

The

"proposition -----

and so distinctly

hlightown v.

Thornton,

8 Ga.,

settlea

v. Schuyler,
is so clear up-

by authu'ity,

486, 505.

nothing but confusion can flow from its

that

108 U.

Church,

Fifth -a,-.

-Paltimore and Potomac E.

in

. Justice Field

3.

rule

sa:?s:

31",

is

a corporation for a tort,

iu

that

resPect

"The

L.

co.v.

aoctrine

an action will not lie

that

which was sometimes asserted,

against

Again,

?lairn enunciation."

ear no more than

will

"It

disc ssionl",

exploued.

bad

'iht

as

now alipliss to corporations

to individuals."
These quotations serve to show houw deeply routed is the
principle they

involve and tne

-n

ncompromising manner

which that principle is put by the judiciary of the

coun

try.
denied the

A few jurisdictions have, however,
doctrine.

(a).

But these cases setting forth the oi,-

posite view of the situation would pass

unnoticed wer-e

it not for the fact that they present the r(eord of a
great mistake which

succeeding

judges on the

es have seen and gladly ructified.
petty show of defiance only
corporation which is
lish

0

(b).

same

In effect,

benchthis

ave strength to the rule of

so fundamental

and American jurisprudence

it

tiit

in

modern Eng-

stands uncontradict-

ed.

(A) Orr v. Bank of U. S., 1 Ohio, 37.
(R) Atlantic & Great Western hy. Co., v. Dunn, 19 011io
St. 163.

I.

CHAPTER

Th~e

fact

main a Jactor

in

necessarily

the lw of master and

leads the uisof

into tiie fielc

for torts

liability

cussion of its

can re-

world only thruugi t,-ie

the cormaerci~l
of irndividcals

instrumentality

exist atic

cn

a corporation

thLt

servant.

ut the legal relation which the

corporation is

thus forced to assume negatives an: attempt at ascer#
taining the presence of responsibility by drawin6 distinctions between the different

classes into which em-

ployment is usually divided. An agent is given a certain
discretion in the performance of his duties while the
ordinary servant

works

mechanically, but,

never-

theless, the difierence resolves itself simply into one
of degree.

The liability of a corporation remains the

same whether its
or master.

position be that

of principal, employer

(a).

The corporation thus made a principal from the moment of its creation, the power to appoint
lows as a necessary

incident

and

is

usually

though sometimes conferred by lebislative
(a) Schou. Dom. Rel. Sec. 461; 1,eche
(L) Gen. Corp. Law of K,,.Y., Sec. 11,

agents folimplied

enactment
on Aoeucy
su). 4.

Sec.

(b),
2.

This authority

is

exercisuct in

the same rfrirner as if

undertaken by a natural person (a).

And, so, in the

absence of' statutury provisions to tie contrary, the
authority of a corporation's

agents n .- d nut be Proved

by a writing, but may be presumed from the nature and
Implied authority

facts of the particular case (b).
may raise an es~oppel

as in

one case :iere a corporation

allowed persons, working under the direction of' its employe, to pursue their labor under the impression that
they wer'e working for the

corporation (c).

Authority

is also proved bi showing that the principal has received
the benefits of the transaction and has adopted .na appropriated the work of the agent

(d); provided tiL

was intended to directly benefit the principal
(a) Kelly v.

Board of Public Wtrks,

7b Va.

263;

work

(e).
New Eng.

Fire Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 25 Ind. 53b; Randall v. Van
Vechten 19 John. 60; Maine Stage Cu.v. Longley, 14 Me.
444.
(b) Wrarren v. Ocean Ins. Co., 16 Me. 439.
(c) Gowen Marble Co. v. Tarrant, 73 Ill. 608.
(0d. Peterson v. Mayor &c. of Tew York.
R. R. I. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Wilcox of Ill.
417i
Kelley v. Newburyport Horse R. R., 141 LI/,ss. 490.
(e) Western Pub. House v. D. T. of' Rock 84 Iowa 101.

Where the

agency is

to

be proved,

the assertions of the ageft
must be shown (a).
ed by agreement

(b),

somethinb more

titn

that tke relation exists,

A revocation of' a.-thurity is effectby dissolutiun of the

corporation,

or, of course, by the death of the agent.
Generally speaking, any person may be the subject
of the execution of the ri;ht of appjointment.
case it is stated that,

In one

"any one except a lunatic, im-

becile or child of tender years nuay Le an agent for
another. " (c).

Authority may ;e conferred upon a part-

nership, and in such a ccse the act of any partner is
the act of the firm (d).

Corporations are, Also, al-

lowecd to carry on business for uthers and to act in
practically the same manner as if the work were being
performed by an individual (e).

By legislation in

some states the relation has practically been given ar
unlimited scope (f) .

And, indeea, the relation of

agent is slrrounaed by so few requirements that very often persons incapable of occupying the position of principal are employed to act as agents

(g).

(a) Hatch v. Squires, 11 Mich. 185.
(b) Rowe v. Rand. 111 Ind. 206.
(c) Lyon & Co. v. Kent, Payne & Co., 45 -,1a. 656.
(d) Deakin v. Underwood, 37 Minn. 98.
(e) McWilliams v. Detroit Central :iills
Co., 31 IVich.
274.
(f) Cal. Code, Sec. 2296; Dak. Code, Sec. 1338.
(g) Weisbrod v. Chicago, &c. hk.
Co.18 Wis. 3b;

After

huovever,

a 1 . ,1 ointrrient,

the agent which are
ment

that gr-at

so nearly

the corporation is,

so far

it

was held that

loss of' the box,

the a,_ent

the sender and not of
.eneral rule
pals
of t

in
1e

a

fact

are bound

but

if

Laving become

Lct

a box

officiaiz;,

its

tie

tlie agent
It

(a).

of
is

tiue

for both princi-

both principals

and they contract with

(b).

concerned,

liable for

corrinon cari .er

te

whether

erson sent

of one of

tuiat an a~ent cannot

contract;

1

company wai not

the

hIls &i-lOy-

to determine

as that d ty is

c.re

in

if

the line

So where a

the &,oent's principal.
by an express conipany

in

necessary

is

care

be ptirformud by

duties may

are aware

that knowledge,

both

Agency may extend through one or more

persons, themselves

-gents, provided the

sub-agent is

practically in the employ of the original principal.
If the sub-a!gent

is so connected with the principal, the

intermediate party becomes a mere legal conauit.

Here

it may be stated that the question of liability for acts
of fellow-servants is now undisputed and so miy Le
excluded.

Tie principal

&s not

responsible

for

inju-

ries suistained by a fellow-servant throagh the miscunduct of another, if'

the principal has used care in se-

lecting 1is servants. (c).
(a)
(b)
(c)

Fitzsinrnons v. The So. Ex. Co., 40 6a. 330.
Robinson v. Jarvis, 25 ,o. App. 421.
Colo. &c. R. R. v. 0,c:en, 3 Colo., 499.

Persons working for tLe
ment

basis,

ing in
in

the

,s;ame employ-

are fellow-serva nts.
general understanding

With this
as a

sarrie master in

are to determine

-e

furtherance

or the interests

a position to render

just wl.at persons workof a

that body liable

copjoratiun are
for their

And, first, persons performing duties

tortious nacts.
indepenctent

of the termy, "agent"

of any control

or

supervision of th&princi-

pal are to be nxcluided a;Lbein6 entirely without the limits of the law of agency.
independent

Injuries occasioned by these

contractors, as they are c1l1ed, or by per-

sons in their employ, are not, as a rule, imputable to
the principal
tiff, an

(a).

Thuis in a New York case the plain-

employe of one Dillon who was engaged by de-

fendant to transfer rails from vessels to cars by means
of defendant's derrick, brought suit to relover for injuries sustained by the falling of the derrick, but was
not allowed to recover on the ground that Dillon was a
contractor.(b).
court

The proposition which guided the

in rendering the decision was, that

"if the person

who was the inediate cause of' the injury was a contractor, engaged in performing a contract to do a specific
(a) Bailey v. Troy & Boston R. R. Co., 57 vt. 252; Hass v.
Phila. &c. Steamship Co. 88 Pa. St. 2u9; City of St.
Paul v. Seitz. 3 Minn. 205;Eaton v. Eu. &c. Ry. Co. 59 1w520
(b) King v. N. Y. &c. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 186.

.....- , the relation of' master and servant is nut

work,

created by the

contract betweun the parties, and for the

contractor's neglige ce while perfurming the work, the
other party

is

not liable".

The rule has its exceptions anu, they must be carenoted since

folly

probably more frequently

they rre

The

the rule itself.

called into application than is

exceptions are embodied by some courts in

t1 e statement

that where the injury "is entirely the result of the
wrongful

acts

of tle contractor

employer is not liable;

or his workmen,

the ---

but where the obstruction or

defect which occasioned the -njury

results directly from

the acts which the contractor agreed and was authorized
to do,

the person who employs the contractor and author-

izes him to do those acts is --party
stated,

(a)'.
if

The statement
the performance

is liable to the injured

is somewhat vague.
of the work results

creation of a nuisance, or the work
not

be carried

principal

on without

is liable.

inj

Better
in

the

is unlawful or can-

ry to third parties,

Where a drain was

the

so negligently

constructed as to cause a nuisance by alluwing tide Waters to flow into cellars of aajoining property holders,

the principal was held liable
(a) Water Co. v. Ware, lu vall.
125 Mass. 232.

(b)
506;

Gorman v.

Gross,

The employment by contractors of

nlawf-l means for

collecting a debt was held to render the irincipal
ble to the injured party
duties

(A).

The failure

lia-

to perform

imposed by l-w makes the person commanued amen-

injury r ,sulting from the negligence, as
ouritt ec
place
aefendantlto
ordinance,
where, in violation uf an
able for all

lights about
was

an obstruction in a street and plaintiff

injured, defendant was held liaile

(c).

Municipal

corporations are bound to keep their streets in a
condition for the use of t.ie public
liable

for any

injuries

in

safe

traveling and are

caused through the improper per-

formance of this duty

(d).

As is easily seen, a corporation is bound by the
acts of persons only when those persons because of express or implied authority are held out to the world as
the representatives of the corporation for certqin purposes.

Hence, as,

"a corporation should have a full

and complete organiz\,ation and existence as an entity
before

it can enter into any kind of a contract or tran-

sact any business", no one can before such orjanization
(b) p. 9. Sturges v. Theological Ed. Society, 130 Miass
414; Cuff v. Newark &c. R. h. -o., 35 N. J. L. 17; Scam.
mon v. City of Chicao, 25 111. 3L1.
(a)
Casswell v. Cross, 120 iss
545.
(c) Wilson & Bro. v. White, 71 Ga. 50u.
(d) Storrs v. City of Utica, 17 .. Y. 104.

witil ';io
rendov a corporation liable to i..rties
1
deals or conies

ii contact

responsible for any tlin6
poration would be

&

(a).

he

To huld a corpoiration

which uccu ud before

iriere absurdity.

its inco'-

Purents might

;s

well be allowed to make contracts binding on an unborn
child.

Not un\'til the time of its birth does a cor-

poration "acquire its faculties to transact its business and 1)erform its fuctions ' .
would

produce inaalti.able

A different rule

harm to persons contempllat-

ing the pursuit of business through incorporated bodies
and would also make the public suspicious and doubtful
whenever approached by promotef-s or other persons sceking to obtain support for tlie corporation.

With a vie w

to the law%, of tort, persons would cease to fum corporations preJ'ey-ring to trans~ct bosiiess on a nore limited
scale than take the chance of becoming liable for the
innimirerable injuries which agents in working for the
corporation might commit.

An interesting case on this

point is Ferry v. ". F. & N. P. R. h. Co.,

50 Cal. 435.

There defendant was sued for trespass and injury to certain real estate owned by plaintiff.
that al

Defendant set up

the time t :e tresi ass wis conmnittci

it

(defendarn4

wt,s unicoi±porated.
(a) Marchland v. Loan & Pledge Assn.,
Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen 152.

26 La. Ann. 389;

The court

in deciding the case said:

"For any trespass

conaitted prior to the incorporation of the aefendant,
the

inaividuals

committing or airecting

would be responsible in d Li;ge,

s--ch tre -pass

but defendant

cannot be

made to respond for an injury done before it had an
existenbe".
A corporation is incorporated usually by compliance with
the terms of the statutes proviaing for the formation
of corporations. In New York, certificates of incorporation are presumtive evidence of legal existence
ten, the filing of a certificate
to corporate existence but
And so a bona fide effort
erally sufficient

if the

(a).

0t-

is not a prerequisite

is simply evidence of it

(b).

to form a corporation is genintent be followed by an assump-

tion of corporate functions.
Acts committed after dissolution are obviously unimputable to a once-existent

corporation.

The reason

for the rule is that which rtlieves corporations from
liability for the acts of promoters: viz.,
lation of principal and agent does not
necessary parties are not present.

that the

exist because the

The case is even

stronger than that of acts done before incorporation

(a)
Ib)

re-

';ew York q en. Corp. Law, Sec. 9.
Vanneman v. Young, 20 A.
(N. J.) 53.

the latter

as in

case afjlrmance of' an act may be made

sich a
while a dissolved corporation could never hve
1
When dissolved no vestige of former existence

right.
remains.

So actions agairnEt a corporation after it has

ceased to live are void (a).

But the dissolution does

not effect rights existing at the time of dissolution.
The assets of a corporation [-ecome a trAst fund for the
benefit of all creditors. A corporation may h-e diss-olved
by the act of the le islature in repealing its
charter or by the natural expiration of the time for
which the charter was granted. In some states enabling
statutes exist by compliance with which the corporation
may at any time dissolve itself.
In the cases above presented it will be noticed
that the relation of principal and a6ent did not exist
and the corporation was permitted to protect
showing that fact.

itself by

.e now come to the uiscussion of

those cases where the corporation seeks to defend it self from liability for the tortious acts of ,ersons
whom it admits are in its employ.

Because of' the abo-

lition to a large extent of tihe doctrine of Ultra Vires
(ai National Bank v. Oolby, 21 Wall. 614i Greeley v.
Smith, 3 Story 658.

which confined the duties and privile;es uf a corporation strictly to tie

,rovi,;ions of the charter creating

it, numerous opportunities for ueciding q-estions of this
nature

in

the courts haveoeen oifered.

And the re-

s7Jit has been, as before stated, to render a corporation
liable for tha wrongs perpetrated by its agents;
reform did nut reachi

but the
There

beyond its proper bounds.

is line, therefore, beyond which even the most liberal
Hence, when an agent attempts to

judges dare not go.

do any thing which is not in accordance with the intent
bf the corporation's charter and wholly without the corporate powers

and the limits of the business it was in-

tended to pursue, the responsibility for the act remains
This rule precludes directors who

solely in the agent.

ate mere agents from launching the copporation with which
they are connected into difficulty by Ultra vires

acts.

So it is said that a corporation co~ld not be held liable for assault and battery, if, in obedience to the demands of the directors, an agent should attack and beat
for the act was not one connected with

a certain person;

the transaction of the business for which the company
was incorporated
(a)

Brokaw v.

(a).

N. J.

R.

& Trans.

Co.,

62 N.

J.

L.

328.

points out and 1'orri the nature

no case definitely

But

.ourt will

of the thing no

ever be able tupo±rnt out

just

where the dividing line is situated.

Ti~u q.,estion is

in

eacii particL .lar

one of construction fur the judus

case as it arises, and so the grouna already gained is
by dif'ferrnces

to be lost

as likely

Probaly

To be more sharply deflined.

likely

enunciation of
Marshall,
"Withouat

Ch.

the doctrine
J.,

in

body

(an

it

is

the oruaest
that of

of Ulti'a vrires is

2 (,ranch, 16'i,

ascril-ing tu this

of opinion as

where he

says:

insurance

compny)

which in its corporate capacity is the mere creature
of the Act to which it

the qual-

owes its existence, all

ities and disabilities annexed by the common law to ancient institutions of this sort,

it may te correctly

sid to be precisely what the incorporating act has
made

it,

to dervie all

and to

powers from that Act,

its

capable of exerting its faculties only in the manner in
which that act authurizes".

This statement is with-

out doubt too conservative and could hardly s-uffice to
cover some cases which have carried the (octrine of irnplied powers to an almost unlimited extent. Yet
ily any court would keep within the bounds of
in

rendering

a decision.

So where

the teller

ordinar-

the rule
of a

)ank

by deceitful refresentations induced piaintiif to pur-

be

chase certain tailroaa bnds, the bank, on being sued
for damages resulting from the purchase,
liable

(a).

In

cases quite similar no doubt thie de-

fense of Ultra Vires would be sustained,
party left

ws held not

and the injured

to his right of action a."inst theagent

(b).

The decision of the above case turned upon the construction put upon the woras

"Lu: and sell",

which were con-

tained in the Act under which the hank was organized.
This illustrates

the difficulty of determining the effect

of an act performed under the provisions of a charter
so Seneral in its terms.

'"he rsponsibility for the

act turns on a pivot ana may be quite easily shifted
so as to fall either on the agent or the corporation.
A case which seems to be in the border-land between acts
Ultra Vires and those for which the corporation is liable is Hutchinson v.
634.

Western & AtI. R. R. Co.,

6 heisk.

There a corporation, chartered to construct and

operate certain railways undertook to run in connection
with the road a steamship line. Two of the boats collicdd
and a passenger was killed. The corpovation excused its
acts on the ground that

(a)
(b)

it had no authority to run

Weckler v. Pirst NTational Bank,
Loyd v. city of Col-Lmbus, (Ga.)

42 i1 6h. 580.
15 S. E. 818.

the boats.
as e-s1ly

The court

said that acts Ultra Vires were

imputed to uoror-tions

"else the maxim,

th-t

his own wrong'

is

"

as to indiviauals,

'no man si~ll
vio~iat0Q.

take

!ut

this

cv-ntae of'
statement

is

layLely qualil'ied by t e remark that. tni- liability
the corporation is insured

of

if it has knov&ledge ol' the

act and reco;7nizes it .-s done to carry on its business.
O)ther cases put the. (ooctrine as strongly as the
last cited

(A); but

it

case

is to be noticed that tle, position

taken t)y the corporation generally amounts to a direct
affirmance of the act.

The broad statrment of the rule

is made without pointing tne possibility of the act being
of such a nature as to oissolve for the moment
lation

the re-

between the principal and his aent.
The second requisite for fixing the liability of

the corporation for the tortious acts of its servants
is that teact

shall be wi-thin the real or apparent

scope of the agent's employment.
ament

Wlen the act ol

the

is of such a character as to be imputable to the

principal

is as difficult

to determine as it

is to

s-

certain when the act is within the corporate powers.
There are few giuiCes and t t

question

is consequently

(a) Nat. r1ank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 69J; Aiox.nder v.
Relfe, 74 Mo. 495; N. Y. &c. R. R. Qo.v. hring, 41
N. J. L. 137.

one of proof of i tention in the business meaning of
that term.

be in

If the act

furtherance of' tne uity

to be performed or necessarily incident to it the corporation is liable though the act be unauthorized or
in some cases if it be expressly Aiorbidden.

Thus where

a gate-keeper, upon !.he attempt of plaintili to pass
through a gate without

tiff

not

a ticket,

CaLsed plain-

to be arrested and iMprisoned, defendant, a rail-

road company,
been

projiucing

,,,as held li,

_e(a).The gate-keeper had

ordered to prevent the passage of any person
showing a ticket, and his action was, as he thought,

the proper way of carr-'ing out the instructions.

In

the co rse of the opinion the court said : "It matters
not that he

(gate-k ;eper) exceeded the powers confeired

upon him by his principal and that he aid an act whicui
the principal xa, not authurized to do so ling as he
acted in the line of his duty, or, being engaged in the
service of the defenac nt, attempted to perform a duty
pertaining, ot which he believed to pertain, t o that
service".

So in

cases where a corporation empiys

persons to arrest and prosecute any one fo ind obstrucing
its tracks , and the agent arrests an innocent person
(a) Lynch v.

IIetropolitan El.

R.

co.,

90

Y. .'Il.

the corporation is liable

The

(a).

ct may

be wilful

and committed expressly for the purpose of working out
the agen-t's ill will a ainst tleperson injured and yet
the corporation is liable.
v. Jackson, 81 Ind. 19,

In T. H. and Ind. R. h. Co.

a railway company was held lia-

ble for the act of a trainman in throwing water upon
plaintiff who was seated in a car.

Althoujh no set

rule can be promulgated whereby the acts within the
agent's scope of authority may be eisily distinguished
from those without, it

is at least certain that a cor-

poration's liability for
agents "Is

the unauthorized acts of its

limited to unauthorized modes of doing

authorized acts".

Thus w!.iere a street car conductor

threw plaintiff from the car because he refused to aioht
not
while the car was in motion, the companywqs 4ieldAliable

(b).

The court admitted the indefiniteness of the

rule but stated that the difficiilty arose not in the
principle but

in its application.

Of course, in this

case, the act of the conductor was wholly uncalled for;
though the deeision might have been different had the
act been comitted when the passenger was alighting.
(a) Evansville & T. H. R-.
Co. v. ;ucKee, 99 Ind. 519;
The Penn. ilo. v. Weddle, 100 lnd. 139.
(b) Isaacs v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 4if N. Y. 122.

And yet the

Indiana courts would, it

seems,

,iold the
In T.

corn pany liable under almst any circ*matarices.

H. and

Ind. R. R. Co. v. Jackson (supra) it ws

said:'

"The appellant .lad undertaken to carry t-it plaintiff
as a passenger upon its train and. was bound to do it
safely.

For this purpose, the appellant was represent-

ed by its

-.gents in

did any thing

charge

of..the trains, and if they

inconsistert with the safe carriage

delivery of the Plaintiff, upon the pl
ples of law as well as
for t-.e injury."

irest

and

princi-

ood public policy, is liabla

The directions to an agent given by

h4s principal are often of much consequence as showing
what

the agent

was authorized to do [ut they do not have

the effect of shielding the principal fvom liability.
The

authority of' tne agent

is usuully a matter of' infer-

ence and is to Le discovered from surrounding circumstances and the usual course of business.

It is ,aid

that the principal will not be presumed to authorize
the cormission of any thing unlawful, but

the presump-

tion is of almost no effect.

The apparent authority

of an agent may be made up of:

1. Powers cctually con-

ferred by the principal. 2. Powers

incidental i. e.,

those necessary to carry into eflect

tiie powers con-

ferred. 3. Powe s wnich cre annexed by cu-stom or usage

21

to the express authority actuall;

4.

conferred.

Powers

which principal h~s by his condu-t led third jersons to
believe he has conferried on his agent.
whiclh princii~al has ien

Skaggs,

62 Ala.

180.

in

ti:e grin-

ratifi,;tiun

cipal must have knowleaLue of the wrun,
H-erring v.

Puwers

deemed to . ve --atified.

order triat there may i)e a le.al

(a)

D.

(_).

CH APT

E R

II.

The rble that corporations are liable fur torts
in

the same manner as ircividuals
is

circumstanctes,

-re,

uncter tiie s5Jie

found to be entirely too broad when

the different cla,,ses of corporations ere taken into
consideration.

The wiCde6t ciierence exists between

private and municipal corporations ii, respect to their
liability.

The first ale fairly within thlu rule above

stated and so need no esecial mention.

Municipal

corporations are to be ouistinouished from quasi-public
corporations which are liable for torts only w-en so
declared so by statute.

In Shelaon v. Kalamazoo, 24

Mich. 383, the general tule as to tue liability of mumicipal corporations is stated thus : "T _e doctrine is
entirely untenable that tI ere can be no municipal liability for unlawf;1 acts done by municipal authorities
to the prejudice of private parties.

In this respect,

public c,.rporations are as distinctly legal persons as
priv-te corporations.

There are officers who are cor-

poration atents, and tilere are municipal officers whose
duties are independent of agency and with distinct liabilities.

But whn the act done is in law

a corporate act, tliVre

is no gi'ound upon rt'son or

authority for hlaing th-t if tiere is any le, al li.t.ility at all arising out

of' it,

a corporatiun rriy not

be

answerable- - - to hold that positive vrrongs must in all
cases be co,sidered as purely individual
rate acts, would be a

novelty

i.

and nut corpo-

jurisprudence."

We are concerned only with tnu

explanation of tue

sentence above quoted wnich speaks or corpozate agent'.
The officer of a municiial

corporation

ca& bind

the

act.

An

corporation only when he ha6 authority to

act might be done colore officii,but unless authorized
the a jeut

is,

so iar as that particular act

is concerned,

wholly aivested of thue power incidental to his position
(a).

The authority may

be expressly

may be inferred from the general
It

authority.
Lona fide

in

the

scope

conferred

or it

of' the agent's

is held that for tortious acts done
course of tne performance

the corporation is liable.

of a dty

As where an overseer of

hijhways, having gene_.aJ authority to card for public
streets, entered upon the premises uf plaintiff and set
Lack his fence claiming t1 at it

encroa ffhed upon the

erty of the public (b).
40 rul. Y., 442.
(a) Lee v. village of SanA. hill,
(b) Thayer v. 0ity of Toston, 19 Pick., 511.

,rop-

of a ruricipAll

Put who are agt;. ts
those p,'sons

who are controlle-d

corporation

Y Only
anid

by the corporation

Persons enlojuuc
are employed for its esecial benelit.
considered
idcause/,necessarily incidehit to t inlu existence of a town
or city are not agents

in the sense of being able to

render the porporation liable for their acts.
where

Thus

a person was run over and killed by an ambuiance

belo-2iging

to tie

city and driven by an employe of the

Coriliissiol of puklic ch/ities, the city wa;3 held not
lia;!e because the agent was Lan officer provided for
by legislative enactment
of police officers

(b),

(a). For the sane reason acts
firemen

(c) and persons appoint-

ed to carry into execution sanitary regulations

(a) are

not imputable to the corporation. The matter is well
in
expluinedNMaximilian v. Mtror (supra).
The court said:
"There are two kinds of d tiswhich are imposed upon a
municipal corporation.

One is of that ki:d whicl

arises

from the grant of a special power, --- ; the other is of

(a) .,axiriilian v.

%,:ayor, o2 N. Y. 160.
(b) Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1. .llen 172; Wisiiart v.
City of Erandon, 4 M-nitoba, 453.
(c)Hafford v. City of Eedford, 16 Gray, 297; Hames v.
City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis.,314; Fisher v. Toston,104.
,,ass. 87, Lawson v. City of S~ttle, (Wan.) 33 P,,347;
Alexander v. City of' Vicksburg,68 Miss.,564; Gillespie
v. City of Lincoln, (Teb.)52 N. W.,811.
(d)Ogg v. City of Lanslng,35 Ia., 495.

that kind which
politioal
---

arises,

riohts under

In

the exercise

or

the

is

eneral

invo1lvos a municiality

or for an

anu under
and use of

ceijtanco
is

of

law,

a private

like

poration, and is lial-le for a failure
well,

from the use

of' the former power,

duty to the public which tl]e
power

implied,

to use

injury caused by using it

where the power is intrusted to it

IO

thu

cor-

its

power

badly.

Put

as one of the politi-

cal divisions of the State, and is conferred nut for the

irmLediate ienl'it of the municipality, but as a means
to be exercised of the sovereign power for the benefit
of all citizens, the corporation is not liable for nonuser, nor for misuser by public agents.'
The other class of corporations differing from
private corporations in the matter of liability are

those founded for cha itable purposes.

ly the weight

of authority such institutions are taken entirely with-

out the operation of: the doctrine of Respondeat superior
ant

so are not

responsible for acts of tiieir agents.

proceeds upon the SiJound that the .)bject of such
the
corporations is
benefit of the public and that withoLt

Th

rule

this protection to charitable corporations t.--e public
would sul'fer the loss of many of tdse

institutions;

as few corporations would survive the suits which persons whom they are compelled to employ woKuld cast upon
them.

So it

is said : "---

TIhe law jealously 6uards

the charitablle trust fund, and does nut permit it to be
frittered away by the negligent acts of those emplued
in its execution".

In Fire Ins. Patrol v. Loyd, 120

Pa. St. 624, it was soubht to hold defenddnt liable for
wrongfully causin ; the death of plaintiff's relative.
Deceased

a,; killed by a b undle thrown from a window by

agent of defendant.

The court said:

patrol is a public charity.

"The insurance

It has no property or funds

which h._ s not been contributed for the purposes of charity, and it would be against all law anui all equity to
take those trust funds so contributed for a special
charitable purpose to compensate injuries inflicted or
ogcasioned by the negligence of the aent or servant of
the patrol.

It wodA.d be carrying the doctrine of

respondeat superior
length.

to an unreasonable anC dangerous

--- I trust and

elieve it will never ie ex-

tended to the sweeping away of public charitites; to the
misapplication of funds especially contributed for a
public charitable purpose and objects not contemplated
by the donors".

No court denies the correctness of ti:e rule.

But F'ode

Island seems to hz-ve laid down the opposite doct'ine
in Galvin v. R. I. hospital, 12 R. 1. 411.
was one brought to recover Qanmagcs for
tained by a patient throu,,n lhe
hospital attenarits

•

The case

injuries sus-

improper treatment

of

From the reasons for the holdin,

given in the 6pinion it would seem to appear that the
case went on thegruund that the corporation wrs negligent in the

,election of its servants.

If this be the

basis of the decision , the court aiffered but little
from other authorities.

For in ' ew York an allegation

of negl Lence on the part of' officers of' a charitable

corporation in the selections of its agents is sufficient to warrant a continuanco of the a. tion (a).
lut whatever may be the reasons for the decision, the
legislature, shortly after the decision, passed 4n act
relieving charitable co~prations of all liability for
the tortious acts of tneir serv.nts (b) and thus luft
the doctrine clear and settled (c).
(a) Hass v. Miss . Society,6 Misc. (N.Y.) 281.
(b) Laws of Rhode Island, 18F0, Chapt. 163, Suc. 1.
(c) ,enton v. Trustees of Boston (,ity hospital,140 Lass.
13; Perry v. hOuse of Refuge,63 Mad. 20; Dows v. _iarper
Hospital, (Mich. ) 60 1T. . 42.

